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The Antitrusting of Patentability
Saurabh Vishnubhakat*
Deciding a patent’s validity is costly, and so is deciding it incorrectly.
Judges and juries must expend significant resources in order to reach a
patent validity determination that is properly informed by the relevant facts.
At the same time, patent validity determinations reached quickly and cheaply
may conserve resources today while creating future costs. Wrongly
preserving an invalid patent can distort the competitive market and enable
abuses, such as nuisance litigation. Meanwhile, wrongly striking down a
valid patent can undermine incentives for continued investment and
commercialization in knowledge assets. Courts facing patent validity issues
have begun to strike this balance in favor of conserving resources today—in
a manner that is strikingly similar to the per se analysis in antitrust law. A
per se rule disposes of supposedly easy cases without engaging in the more
fact-intensive “rule of reason” analysis. However, although antitrust
jurisprudence cautions against per se rules because of the risk of error and
imposes important requirements for the use of per se rules, recent patent
jurisprudence has borrowed incautiously from antitrust.
This Article explains how the requirements for patentability enable the
use of per se analysis, describes how the proper conditions for antitrust per
se analysis would translate into patent law, and argues that the current use
of antitrust-style judicial shortcuts does not satisfy these conditions in patent
law. This Article concludes with a set of proposals for recalibrating the
present costs of reaching informed patent validity decisions against the
future costs that arise from generating decisions incorrectly.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Just as the antitrust system seeks to penalize anticompetitive conduct
while leaving procompetitive conduct alone, the patent system seeks to deny
patents to inventions that are not truly patentable—because they do not
satisfy the various requirements of patentability—while leaving intact
patents that cover meritorious inventions. Both systems grapple with the
jurisprudential tension between legal standards and legal rules that is
inherent in managing error costs. Only antitrust law, however, has evolved
a systematic approach to managing decision costs. That approach is to
evaluate conduct under the costly but more accurate rule of reason unless the
risk of error is suitably low that a per se rule having relatively low decision
costs may profitably be adopted instead. Moreover, as there is an inverse
relationship between decision costs and error costs, the antitrust approach
also includes a limited evidentiary compromise embodied in so-called quick
look review.
Patent law has begun to borrow from this approach by using the
doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter as a shorthand for the more factintensive and costly doctrinal inquiries into whether an invention is truly
patentable. In other words, subject-matter eligibility has become a sort of
per se rule of validity (or rather invalidity) whereas other, more finelygrained requirements of patentability reflect the usual rule of reason. This
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“antitrusting” of patentability—the use of jurisprudential tools of decision
from antitrust in evaluating patent validity—is relatively new in patent law.
This Article identifies that trend and critiques its current form. The
management of legal decision costs through conclusive presumptions amid
an otherwise fact-intensive analysis is not unique to antitrust. Still, antitrust
law has a particularly well-developed history and jurisprudence in this
regard, and it is fitting in some respects that evaluators of patent validity have
come to rely on antitrust law to solve this problem given the close
relationship between the subjects of patent and antitrust.
Whether patents are tantamount to monopolies, and should be treated
accordingly, is a longstanding debate in the law. Early courts referred at
times to patent rights as a form of monopoly.1 Some, however, took pains
to distinguish patents from monopolies.2 Modern patent jurisprudence is of
two minds on the subject. The Supreme Court generally continues to refer
to patents as a form of monopoly.3 By contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit often rejects sweeping comparisons of patents to
monopolies.4 This is significant because the Federal Circuit has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over patent-related cases5 and, as a result, sets the large
majority of precedent in patent law. Indeed, beyond the commonsense
1

E.g., Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477, 494 (1850) (“[T]he monopoly granted to the
patentee is for one entire thing; it is the exclusive right of making, using, and vending to others
to be used, the improvement he has invented, and for which the patent is granted.”); Evans v.
Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 413 (1822) (“[P]atent law confers a benefit on the discoverer of any artful
invention, which consists in a monopoly of his invention for a limited time.”).
2
E.g., Singer v. Walmsley, 22 F. Cas. 207, 208 (C.C.D. Md. 1860) (“Patents are not
monopolies . . . because a monopoly is that which segregates that which was common before,
and gives it to one person or to a class, for use or profit; a patent is that which brings out from
the realm of mind something that never existed before, and gives it to the country.”).
3
See, e.g., Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014)
(“Congress has enacted patent laws rewarding inventors with a limited monopoly.”); Bilski
v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611–12 (2010) (“Allowing petitioners to patent risk hedging would
pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an
abstract idea.”); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (describing a patent as an
“exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time”); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 24 (1997) (referring to the “patent monopoly”).
4
See, e.g., Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., 756 F.2d 1556, 1559 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (“[T]his court has disapproved of a challenger’s characterization of a patentee by the
term ‘monopolist’ . . . .”); Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350,
1367 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (explaining that “patent rights are not legal monopolies in the antitrust
sense of that word”); Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(explaining that, although a patent may colloquially be referred to as a “monopoly”—in light
of the implicit power to exclude competitors from the marketplace—this usage is misdirected
because “a patent is a form of property right, and the right to exclude recognized in a patent
is but the essence of the concept of property”); Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782,
786 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that “[n]owhere in any statute is a patent described as a
monopoly” and calling it “but an obfuscation to refer to a patent as ‘the patent monopoly’”).
5
28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012).
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expectation that a single intermediate appellate court with exclusive
jurisdiction would naturally set the large majority of precedent in a given
field as compared with the vanishingly small share of decisional law that
comes from the Supreme Court, empirical research specifically finds that
district courts also view the Federal Circuit as relatively more authoritative
than they view the Supreme Court in matters of patent law.6
The importance of this ongoing debate over patents as monopolies is
systemic. If patent rights and their exclusionary powers were best
understood as exceptions to the legal and economic preference against
monopolies, then it stands to reason that three results would follow. First,
laws by which inventions are deemed patentable would tend to be construed
stringently. Second, laws by which exercises of patent rights are deemed
violative of antitrust laws would tend to be construed expansively. Third,
the validity of individual patents would tend to be evaluated with an eye to
their anticompetitive effects over and above their compliance solely with
patentability rules.
This Article specifically examines the third of these implications of an
antitrust-based view of patent law. The descriptive contribution of this
Article is to rethink the relationship between patent law’s broad threshold
requirement of subject-matter eligibility and other, narrower statutory
requirements in evaluating patentability as being akin to antitrust law’s
relationship between the per se rule and the rule of reason in evaluating
restraints of trade. Tracing the implications of this rethinking through the
processes for ex ante examination in the Patent Office and ex post
reevaluation of patent validity, this Article reaches three normative
conclusions for adjudicating the boundaries of patent-eligible subject matter.
First, courts that do apply the subject-matter eligibility doctrine can
properly do so only after specifying the technological field of the patented
invention and identifying the person of ordinary skill in that relevant field,
just as the Patent Office does. Second, courts that purport to find patents
invalid for claiming patent-ineligible subject matter can properly do so only
after construing what invention the patent actually claims. Third, and
following from the first two, the recently proposed Crouch-Merges canon of
avoiding patent eligibility questions unless necessary is sound and should be
adopted by the courts.7

6
See, e.g., David R. Pekarek Krohn & Emerson H. Tiller, Federal Circuit Patent
Precedent: An Empirical Study of Institutional Authority and Intellectual Property Ideology,
2012 WIS. L. REV. 1177 (2012).
7
See Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski By Ordering
Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673 (2010). See also infra Part
IV.C.
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This Article proceeds in three main parts. Part II situates the trade-off
between error costs in individual cases and doctrinal predictability over time
within the familiar framework of legal standards and rules. It also identifies
the complementary framework through which antitrust law manages the
trade-off between error costs and decision costs. It then explains how these
frameworks apply to the relationship between the broad doctrine of patenteligible subject matter and the other, more narrow requirements for
patentability. Part III argues that ex post reevaluations of patent validity
increasingly follow the antitrust approach to minimize decision costs but do
so incompletely, without the necessary doctrinal underpinnings that even
antitrust analysis requires. Part IV advocates for filling these doctrinal gaps
in patent-eligible subject matter analysis by additional necessary fact-finding
and offers independent support for the recently proposed Crouch-Merges
canon.
II. WHY PATENT LAW NEEDED ANTITRUST LAW
This part discusses how patent jurisprudence has attempted to balance
the cost of errors in individual cases against the value of predictability in the
long run. It then discusses a complementary approach from antitrust law for
balancing the cost of decision-making against the cost of error in those
decisions. This part concludes that the antitrust approach to reducing
decision costs may be particularly well suited for efficiently resolving
disputes over patent validity if certain conditions are met.
A. Error Costs in Patent Law
The trade-off in patent law between reducing error costs and fostering
predictability tracks the broader, more fundamental debate in law between
standards and rules.8 The primary instrumental aim of patent law and policy
is to promote innovative activity—including invention, disclosure, and

8

See generally John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609 (2009). For a discussion of the relative benefits and costs of
rules and standards in general (rather than in the context of patent law), see FREDERICK
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Russell B. Korobkin,
Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23
(2000); Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101
(1997); Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953
(1995).
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commercialization—and to direct that activity to socially useful ends.9
Flexible standards, in turn, allow the patent system to manage the constant
technological and economic change that innovation necessarily represents.10
Moreover, to the extent that strategic behavior that outpaces existing legal
constraints is undesirable, standards also give decision makers valuable
discretion to penalize conduct that otherwise might evade liability.11 Thus,
a standard-based approach to patentability reduces error costs in two ways.
One way is to reduce the likelihood that a court will reach an incorrect
conclusion about whether a particular invention is patentable under current
law—incorrect in the sense that the result is unsatisfying according to some
extrinsic legal criterion.12 The other is to avoid dynamic losses from conduct
that would, if permitted, stifle future innovative activity.13 The flexibility
and discretion that standards offer, however, come at a cost. Standards offer
little predictability in how the law will eventually be applied and how one’s
present conduct will be adjudged in the future.14
Rules, by contrast, are more definite than standards with respect to the
constraints that are imposed and the compliance that is required.15 The
principal value of a rule-based approach is that it produces case outcomes

9

See Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and
the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 79 (1999) (describing “success in stimulating
the creation, disclosure, and development of inventive or creative works” as the “central
instrumental goals of intellectual property”). For discussions of this instrumental view of the
patent system in the economic literature, see, for example, FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 440 (2d ed. 1980); see also Kenneth J.
Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 617 (Univs.-Nat’l
Bureau Comm. for Econ. Research et al. eds., 1962), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c2144.pdf
(describing the problem of nonoptimal allocation of resources in generating information assets
that will be optimally utilized, and explaining how patent property rights in such information
resolve this problem by restricting the degree to which a firm can appropriate the full value
of the information that it generates).
10
Duffy, supra note 8, at 611.
11
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1639 (2003) (observing that standards, unlike rules, are flexible enough to “take
situational variance into account,” i.e., produce more accurate outcomes).
12
See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit
Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 798–99 (2008) (explaining the greater tendency
of standards than of rules to result in more accurate outcomes).
13
See id. at 798–800 (discussing the inhibitive effect of inaccurate results in the
patentability determination upon future progress and innovation).
14
See id. at 798 (comparing the Supreme Court’s and Federal Circuit’s respective patent
jurisprudences as differently answering the same question of how to balance precision with
accuracy in the law of patentability).
15
See Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1771–72
(2011) (observing that rules, unlike standards, offer “ease of conforming one’s conduct to that
[given legal] principle” in patent law based on a variety of factors including “the uncertainty
associated with individualized determinations of patentability”).
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that more closely align with prior judicial precedents and, by the same token,
more closely align with the prior expectations of the parties.16 Meanwhile,
a more precise and predictable rule may also be consistently wrong
according to some extrinsic legal criterion, especially given the inflexibility
of rules for adapting to circumstances that were unforeseen and
uncontemplated by prior decisions.17 In short, the greater predictability of
rules comes at the cost of potentially higher error costs.
This trade-off has differential effects for private actors in the markets
for innovation as well as for legal institutions. Producers and consumers of
innovation each respond differently to uncertain but more adaptable
standards, and to inflexible but potentially inaccurate rules. Legal
institutions respond differently to standards versus rules as well.
Producer-side actors in innovation markets—e.g., inventors, investors,
and commercializers—tend to favor rules because more certainty produces
higher risk-adjusted returns on the fixed costs of innovation, costs that can
be substantial.18 A particularly salient example of an innovation market with
high fixed costs is biomedicine where the impact of uncertainty from
standards is well-documented in the academic literature as well as in public
policy circles.19 Where this type of legal certainty (that innovation incentives
such as patents will be protected and recouped as expected) is reduced or
altogether absent, the resulting declines in rates of research and development
also tend to be concentrated in the most socially important technologies, i.e.,
technologies in which the generation and disclosure of knowledge would be
most valuable.20 One may reasonably expect, for example, that clear rules
about the patentability of medical diagnostic tests will tend to reduce
uncertainty about ex post competition and thus increase ex ante investment
in the development of such tests.21

16
Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51,
79–81 (2010).
17
Id. at 81; Sullivan, supra note 8, at 63.
18
Duffy, supra note 8, at 611; Dale A. Nance, Rules, Standards, and the Internal Point
of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1287, 1314 n.96 (2006) (“[I]t seems likely that ‘producers’
in . . . a competitive system would work hard to provide definite rules and eschew vague
standards, whenever that is possible.”).
19
E.g., Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving the Future of
Personalized Medicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1881, 1911 (2016) (arguing that “uncertainty
itself affects incentives to innovate, as scientists and investors may be reluctant to move
forward with product development if they cannot determine whether they will be able to
protect their investment”); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., PRIORITIES
FOR PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 14 (2008), http://oncotherapy.us/pdf/PM.Priorities.pdf.
20
Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standards for Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J.
1, 2–3 (1992).
21
E.g., Asher Hodes, Note, Diagnosing Patentable Subject Matter, 26 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 225, 261–62 (2011).
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This expected relationship among clarity of rules, competition, and
investment is a straightforward application of the prospect theory of patent
incentives.22 Even if early innovators who secure broad rights are
overcompensated “well beyond what the reward function would require”23
to induce the given innovation, the patentee is better positioned to
“coordinate post-patenting development and commercialization efforts
among several players, reducing duplicated costs and preventing
competitors’ use of unpatentable information generated in the process.”24
Accordingly, as clear rules about the very patent-eligibility of medical
diagnostic tests are discarded in favor of flexible and unpredictable
standards, as the Supreme Court did in Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,25 the result is uncertainty among industry
actors about whether the patented innovations that undergird their activities
remain stable legal rights that can justify further investment. As one
commentator has put it, “subject matter patentability has never been more
uncertain than after Mayo. Many patents in the biotechnology, medical
diagnostics, and software industries have an unpatentable concept at their
core. But after Mayo, it is unclear whether these patents have added
‘enough’ to the claims to render them patent eligible.”26
By contrast, consumer actors in innovation markets—e.g., users and
implementers of technology, and, in some cases, the general public—tend to
favor standards because rules may generate allocative losses for consumers
of innovation. The inflexibility of rules to adapt to changing economic or
technological conditions may create certainty, but substantive outcomes are
more likely at the margin to be incorrect, all else being equal. The example
of medical diagnostic innovation remains helpful in this regard as well.
Although the criteria governing patent-eligibility were considerably more
rule-like prior to the Supreme Court’s recent doctrinal interventions,27 it was
far from clear that the particular legal rules in place produced outcomes that
22
John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 440
(2004); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 266 (1977); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 374–76
(2010).
23
Kitch, supra note 22, at 267.
24
Sichelman, supra note 22, at 374–75.
25
566 U.S. 66 (2012).
26
Bernard Chao, The Infringement Continuum, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1359, 1386 (2014).
See also Bernard Chao, Moderating Mayo, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 423, 432 (2012) (explaining
that “Mayo has created a kind of pessimistic uncertainty”).
27
See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010
WIS. L. REV. 1353, 1363 (2010) (arguing that subject-matter eligibility exclusions in patent
law “are almost always bright-line rules”); Duffy, supra note 7, at 611 (characterizing the
Federal Circuit’s en banc attempt in the Bilski case to clarify the law of patent-eligibility as a
“rule—not a flexible standard”).

VISHNUBHAKAT_FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

THE ANTITRUSTING OF PATENTABILITY

10/30/2017 5:28 PM

79

were consistently accurate.
The Mayo case was itself an instance where the Patent Office’s
application of the subject-matter eligibility doctrine—with its bright-line
rule exclusions from eligibility—led the agency to issue patents that, the
Court ultimately found, should not have been issued. These patents were
directed to correlations between the concentration in the bloodstream of
certain drug metabolites and the efficacy or toxicity of the drug.28 The
petitioners in the case argued, and the Court’s unanimous opinion concluded,
that the rule was problematic not only for being inflexible, but also for being
the wrong rule, or at least a rule that produced the wrong outcome in the case
at hand.29 By over-inclusively allowing patent claims that preempted the use
of natural correlations, which are ineligible for patent protection, the rulelike approach to patent-eligibility produced patents that the Mayo Court
found frustrated the ability of physicians to provide medical care30 and the
ability of others in medical diagnostics to innovate further.31
To be sure, the dichotomy of preference between innovators and
implementers as to rules and standards is not absolute. Innovators might
well be “sacrificed on the altar of rules” where, for example, the inflexible
application of patentability requirements leads to the invalidation of patent
rights, and such innovators would prefer standards over rules.32 Still, the
incentives that the certainty and consistency of rules produce for investments
in the long term are generally quite different from the incentives that the
flexibility and accuracy of standards offer in the individualized short run.
Different legal institutions also confront different effects from
informational asymmetry that shapes their respective tendencies toward
standards versus rules. On one hand, developing rules carries high
information costs,33 and the Federal Circuit can afford these costs because of
its relatively greater access to doctrinal and technical expertise.34
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has less access to these forms of expertise
and so tends to favor standards because of their lower information costs.35
28
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 73 (2012) (citing
U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 and U.S. Patent No. 6,680,302).
29
Id. at 91–92.
30
Id. at 91.
31
Id. at 92.
32
Schauer, supra note 7, at 135–66; see also Sullivan, supra note 7, at 66.
33
Kaplow, supra note 7, at 627–29 (formalizing the relationship between the tendency
to prefer rules versus standards and the information cost that is associated with promulgating
the rule or promulgating the standard).
34
Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 29–40 (2010)
(discussing the Federal Circuit’s use of rule-formalism in four important doctrinal contexts as
a deliberate attempt to “reduce information costs associated with lay engagement with
technology”).
35
Id. at 42.
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The principal jurisprudential debate of the patent system, then, is over
how to balance decreasing error costs through standards and increasing
predictability through rules. Indeed, a number of other important ongoing
debates in patent law reflect this tension, and the functionalism of the
Supreme Court, as well as the formalism of the Federal Circuit, track the
former’s preference for standards and the latter’s preference for rules.36 The
controversy over exceptionalism in patent doctrine is itself at least partly
reducible to a choice between standards that transcend legal subject matter
and rules that are tailored to patent law.37
Indeed, the forms of patent exceptionalism that are sensitive to the
rules-standards dichotomy variously include federal jurisdiction in patent
law,38 jury review of Patent Office agency actions,39 judicial deference to
Patent Office agency actions both legal40 as well as factual,41 and federal civil
procedure in patent cases.42
Importantly, this balance in patent law between reducing error costs and
fostering predictability omits an additional important consideration: the costs
of generating decisions under either approach. Indeed, patent law does not
appear to have an internal jurisprudential consensus about how to balance
decision costs with other values. For that, it has come to rely on antitrust.
B. Decision Costs in Antitrust
The error cost inquiry in patent law decision-making focuses on what
consequences will follow from false-positive decisions (such as upholding
an invalid patent) or false-negative ones (such as striking down a valid
patent). By contrast, the decision cost inquiry focuses on how decisionmakers reach decisions at all. Decision costs account for the collection and
synthesis of relevant factual and doctrinal information by litigants as well as

36

See generally David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law
Adjudication: Rules and Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 415 (2013).
37
Id. at 490.
38
Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit As a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1791 (2013).
39
John F. Duffy, Jury Review of Administrative Action, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
281 (2013); Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV.
1673 (2013).
40
Stuart M. Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System
Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269 (2007); Sapna Kumar, The Accidental
Agency?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 229 (2013); Kali Murray, First Things, First: A Principled
Approach to Patent Administrative Law, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 29 (2008); Melissa F.
Wasserman The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1959 (2013).
41
Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Field of Invention, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 899 (2017);
Benjamin & Rai, supra note 39.
42
Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules of Patent Procedure, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 63 (2015).
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for the evaluation of this information by the triers of fact and law.43 Given
that patent law has no systematic approach for managing decision costs,
antitrust law’s longstanding approach has proven to be a ready substitute.
That approach is antitrust law’s distinction between conduct that is per se
unlawful and conduct that is unlawful under the rule of reason.44
The use of a per se rule lowers decision costs, often dramatically,
because simply far less remains to fight about. In antitrust, certain categories
of conduct are regarded as unlawful per se only if they pose restraints of
trade “that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and
decrease output.”45 Otherwise, and in general, restraints are unlawful only
if they are shown to be unreasonable—which is to say, shown to have an
overall anticompetitive rather than procompetitive effect in the particular
case at hand.46 This more intensive analysis, the rule of reason, requires
information about whether the accused party had sufficient market power,
and a host of other factors regarding “the restraint’s history, nature, and
effect.”47 As a result, the rule of reason carries high decision costs, and what
these costs buy is more accurate decision-making by reducing the likelihood
of accepting anticompetitive practices and of condemning procompetitive
ones. Decision costs in general are inversely related to error costs.48
Horizontal agreements among competitors to fix prices are a canonical
example of the trade-off in antitrust between the decision costs and error
costs of the per se rule and the rule of reason.49 All that must be established
is that certain practices do, indeed, constitute horizontal price fixing—and
the outcome is determined.50 Particular agreements to fix prices may,
indeed, sometimes have procompetitive effects that outweigh their
anticompetitive potential.51 Nevertheless, courts have held that such netpositive outcomes are so rare and unlikely that the costs of mistakenly
condemning a price-fixing agreement that might have turned out to be
beneficial is quite low, and price-fixing agreements as a category should be
conclusively presumed unreasonable and unlawful, without further

43

Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust, 52 B.C. L. REV.
871, 877 (2011).
44
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1984).
45
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (citing
Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)).
46
Id. at 885–86 (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)).
47
Id. at 885.
48
Easterbrook, supra note 44, at 15. See generally Ehrlich, supra note 7.
49
Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
50
Id. at 344–45 (citing Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)).
51
Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (acknowledging that
“[c]ases that do not fit the generalization [underlying a per se rule] may arise”).
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analysis.52 In other words, courts have found the per se rule to be a useful
analytical tool for adjudicating price-fixing agreements, not merely because
it has low decision costs but because those low decision costs do not come
at the expense of unduly high error costs.
Of course, purporting to impose and use per se rules only where their
associated error costs are also low is an idealized case, even in antitrust law.
The underlying technical and economic facts that make a particular practice
not merely potentially unreasonable, but per se unreasonable, may change.53
Similarly, empirical research may reveal that the reasoning that connects
underlying facts to legal conclusions is flawed.54 Put another way, a per se
rule by its own terms can assure only that its decision costs will be low; its
error costs may rise over time or later be revealed to have been higher all
along. The rule of reason, meanwhile, presents a symmetric situation:
though its decision costs are high, the investment of careful scrutiny into
case-specific context means that the associated error costs are likely to be
low.
Given this general tension between decision cost and error cost, it is
perhaps not surprising that litigants frequently focus, as an initial matter, on
characterizing the disputed conduct strategically as belonging either in the
category of practices that are per se unlawful or in the category that merits
rule of reason analysis.55 Determining the legal status of the disputed
conduct has its own costs, and courts must be able to do so without unduly
dissipating the decisional economy of the per se rule. Accordingly, a third
way has emerged whereby a party accused of certain practices that the per
se rule would cover may offer limited evidence of the procompetitive
benefits of the practice.56 If this quick look at the evidence is persuasive,
then the court will proceed to evaluate the practice more fully under the rule
of reason; if not, the per se rule will determine the outcome.57 Thus, the
quick look accepts some additional decision cost in exchange for lowering
the error cost—or, more precisely, in exchange for more information about
the likelihood of error.

52
Maricopa Cty., 457 U.S. at 351 (holding that “the anticompetitive potential inherent
in all price-fixing agreements justifies their facial invalidation even if procompetitive
justifications are offered for some”).
53
Easterbrook, supra note 43, at 6 (noting that “practices that were deleterious yesterday
may yield benefits today, as the balance of advantage between contractual and market
organization changes”).
54
Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust
Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1266 (2008).
55
See id. at 1215.
56
See generally Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
57
Id. at 769–70.
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C. Borrowing from Antitrust
This orientation of antitrust jurisprudence toward the balance between
decision cost and error cost is strikingly and directly relevant to patent law.
However, this relevance is not widely discussed or applied in patent policy
debates.
1. The Decision Cost of Invalidating Patents
Determining that an invalid patent is invalid is costly. Part of the reason
is that duly issued patents are legally presumed valid,58 and a party
challenging its validity bears the burden of overcoming that presumption59
by clear and convincing evidence.60 There are at least two rationales for
presuming patents valid.
One is the premise that the decision to issue patents follows from the
evaluative efforts of an expert agency whose conclusions are likely to be
correct, at least more likely than inexpert courts acting later.61 Patents are
issued after substantive evaluation in the Patent Office by examiners who
have education and training in the relevant scientific and technical
disciplines to which the patented inventions pertain.62 A patent examiner’s
evaluation compares the invention sought to be patented with the relevant
prior art, which is the existing body of knowledge and commercial activity.63
The examination process is intended to grant patents only on those
inventions that are innovative enough to merit patent protection64 and are
sufficiently well-disclosed that others may benefit meaningfully from what
the patent document teaches.65 Thus, examination proceeds on the basis of
expertise with the technical details of the invention and with the doctrinal
58

35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
Id.
60
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011).
61
Alan Devlin, Revisiting the Presumption of Patent Validity, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 323,
331 n.35–36 (2008) (citing Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350,
1359 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984)); Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley,
Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 52 (2007) (noting that
“the presumption of validity forces courts to defer to the expertise of the PTO, thereby
avoiding redundant and possibly inferior second looks by the courts”).
62
Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 61, at 47 (noting further that “[t]he theoretical
justification [for the presumption of validity] is that patent examiners have expertise when it
comes to questions of patent validity, and if patent examiners have decided that a given
invention qualifies for protection, judges and juries should not second-guess the experts.”).
63
Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Applicants Search for Prior Art?, 53 J.L. & ECON. 399,
399–400 (2010). The various forms of documentary knowledge and commercial activity that
constitute prior art are set forth in the various provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
64
For a discussion of the innovation-related requirements of patentability, see infra Part
III.A.1.
65
For a discussion of the disclosure-related requirements of patentability, see infra Part
III.A.2.
59
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details of patentability, expertise that courts are generally understood to lack
when they revisit the Patent Office’s conclusions.66
Another rationale for presuming patents valid is that patent rights form
the basis for significant economic investments in technology development
and commercialization by ensuring that the exclusionary power of patents
will later help recoup those investments.67 Without an expectation that
issued patents are likely to be legally valid, the stability and security of these
investments will tend to erode,68 and rational investors will consider
reducing and redirecting their investments to other legal regimes for
appropriating value from innovation.69 However, these substitute legal
regimes may not be desirable from the perspective of social welfare and the
dissemination of knowledge.
One particularly stark example of this effect is trade secrecy. On one
hand, the mandatory disclosure requirements of patent law may well “lead
to the underproduction of certain inventions, namely those inventions in
which patent infringement detection would be difficult and therefore trade
secrecy more valuable.”70 On the other hand, however, the lack of mandated
disclosure in trade secrecy would leave inventors who are patent-averse for
any reason “free to maintain inventions as trade secrets, and rational actors
will do precisely that.”71 Thus, when abridging or invalidating an individual
patent, the danger of doing so in ways that systemically weaken patent rights
has long been a cautionary argument for courts, especially the Federal
Circuit72 and the Supreme Court.73
Beyond the presumption of validity and its effects, the decision cost of
invalidating a patent also includes the expense of mounting the invalidity
challenge. This expense is considerable for two reasons of its own.

66
Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 61, at 52 (referring to judicial reevaluations as
“inferior second looks”); Devlin, supra note 61, at 325 (rhetorically questioning, “[w]ho are
lay judges and juries, typically lacking technical and scientific knowledge in the relevant field,
to second guess the PTO’s expertise and informed judgment?”).
67
Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 61, at 52, 56–59; Devlin, supra note 61, at 331.
68
Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 61, at 52, 56–59; Devlin, supra note 61, at 331.
69
See generally Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their
Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent
(or Not) (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 7552, 2000),
www.nber.org/papers/w7552 (discussing a range of mechanisms for appropriating value from
innovation, the relative usage of each by actors in different industries, and the motivations for
these choices).
70
J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 963 (2011).
71
Id. at 963–64.
72
E.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1377
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting); Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285
F.3d 1046, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Newman, J., dissenting).
73
E.g., Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 646 (1947).
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One is simply that patent litigation demands significant material
resources, and its demands have mostly increased over time. The biennial
surveys of the American Intellectual Property Law Association, for example,
show that among low-end patent infringement cases with less than $1 million
in dispute, the median cost of litigation ranged from $600,000 to as high as
$700,000 during the 2005–2015 period.74 For high-end cases with more than
$25 million in dispute, the median cost of litigation ranged from $4.5 million
to as high as $5.5 million over the same period.75 Meanwhile, a party who
prevails in litigation cannot recover these costs through court-ordered feeshifting, save for exceptional cases, making even successful patent
invalidation a cost that the challenger must often simply absorb.76
The other reason why the expense of patent invalidation is high is that
a successful challenger does not merely win the right to practice the patented
invention alone.77 A patent that is invalidated is invalid as against the world,
and the successful challenger opens the door for other rivals to practice the
invention as well, including a great many who contributed nothing to the
expense and effort of mounting the challenge.78 In other words, patent
validity decisions are a type of public economic good and accordingly can
often pose a significant collective action problem.79
2. The Importance of Invalidating (Bad) Patents
Still, despite the high cost, correctly determining that a patent is invalid
can be quite socially valuable. Patents confer powerful rights to exclude
others from making, using, selling, offering, and importing the invention
protected by the patent.80 A subset of these patents reflect meaningful
economic power in their relevant markets in light of available substitutes,81
74

AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 37 (2015).
Id.
76
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012); Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 1749 (2014).
77
See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971)
(holding that a finding of patent invalidity creates nonmutual defensive collateral estoppel
with respect to the patent owner’s assertion of the patent against all future alleged infringers).
78
See generally Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend
Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative
Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943 (2004).
79
John A. Kidwell, Comity, Patent Validity, and the Search for Symmetry: Son of
Blonder-Tongue, 57 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 473, 488–89 (1975); Joseph Scott Miller, Building a
Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667,
688 (2004).
80
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
81
The conventional wisdom, of course, is that most patents confer no such power. John
R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 462 n.115 (2004) (citing HERBERT
HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST ch. 4 (2003); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 8.3 (1985; Salem M. Katsh, Jack E. Brown, & F.M. Scherer,
75
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and this power is justified only if the patented invention satisfies the criteria
of genuine innovation and public disclosure that the law has set as the price
of the patent’s exclusionary power.82
By contrast, the issuance of patents for inventions embodying
knowledge that is already available to the public or is already involved in
existing commercial activity83 would produce an economic distortion by
withdrawing that knowledge from competitive use in the short term, with no
corresponding social benefit in the long term.84 Similar economic distortions
would arise from patents for inventions embodying knowledge that may
technically be new but is only trivially removed from the state of the art and
would have come about even without the inducement of the patent.85 In both
situations, the patent owner’s right to exclude would tend to raise the price
of the invention to supracompetitive levels, producing static inefficiencies in
the form of deadweight losses. These are static inefficiencies that patent law
would otherwise tolerate if there were dynamic efficiency gains from the
production of truly innovative knowledge. Without adequate innovation,
however, there would be only the loss.

Panel Discussion, The Value of Patents and Other Legally Protected Commercial Rights, 53
ANTITRUST L.J. 535, 547 (1985) (“Statistical studies suggest that the vast majority of all
patents confer very little monopoly power”); William Montgomery, Note, The Presumption
of Economic Power for Patented and Copyrighted Products in Tying Arrangements, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1140, 1156 (1985) (“More often than not, however, a patent or copyright
provides little, if any, market power.”).
82
For a discussion of the innovation-related and disclosure-related requirements of
patentability, see infra Parts III.A.1 and III.A.2.
83
Knowledge already available to the public would be prior art in the form of earlierissued patents, published patent applications, and “printed publications.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
Knowledge already involved in commercial activity would be prior art in the form of a good
or service that is “on sale.” Id. Knowledge “in public use” would be prior art under either
rubric. Id.
84
The rhetoric of withdrawing information from the public domain on the basis of
improperly issued patents is a recurring concern in the case law as well as the literature. See,
e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (explaining that
“Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available”).
See also Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 25 (2011); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson
Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 953, 1002 n.247 (2007).
85
Pamela Samuelson, Lecture, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J.
783, 808 n.139 (citing Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Patenting
Science: Protecting the Domain of Accessible Knowledge in The Public Domain of
Information, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN
INFORMATION LAW (Lucie M.C.R. Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006)).

VISHNUBHAKAT_FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

THE ANTITRUSTING OF PATENTABILITY

10/30/2017 5:28 PM

87

Further, even patents that satisfy the innovation-related requirements of
patentability may result in overall inefficiency if they do not adequately
disclose what the invention is,86 how to practice it,87 and what the boundaries
of the patent right are.88 Failure to satisfy these disclosure requirements
would allow patent owners to enjoy exclusionary power in the market that is
sometimes highly disproportionate to the patents’ inventive contributions.
The relationship of these disclosure-related requirements to the normatively
desired economic balance of patent law is usually expressed as
commensurability between what knowledge the inventor contributes and
what economic power the patent confers.89 Disclosure failures, therefore,
are similar to the problem of static inefficiency that results from withdrawing
already-available or already-forthcoming knowledge from public use—with
one caveat. Disclosure failures further create a threat of dynamic
inefficiency, the withdrawal of knowledge that may be generated tomorrow
by others under the shadow of overbroad patents issued today.
The economics of inefficiency in patent law constitute a significant
theoretical and empirical literature that is beyond the scope of this Article.90
However, a unifying theme of this literature is that it is socially valuable to
reach decisions about patent invalidity. The high decision cost of reaching
these socially valuable decisions has, in turn, provoked a wide array of
proposals for procedural and structural reform with mixed success. The use
of subject-matter eligibility as a shorthand for other, more fact-intensive
inquiries into whether an invention is patentable represents a doctrinal
reform toward the same objective—lowering decision costs.

86

35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (codifying the written description requirement).
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (codifying the enablement requirement).
88
35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (codifying the claim definiteness requirement).
89
See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 797 (2002); Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim
Scope into After-Arising Technology: On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning,
41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 506, 509 (2008); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent
Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1152–53, 1182 (2008).
90
For an overview of this literature, see SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND
INCENTIVES (2004); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 843 (1990); William F. Baxter, Legal
Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J.
267 (1966); NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE
ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS (Univs.-Nat’l Bureau Comm. for Econ. Research
et al. eds., 1962), http://econpapers.repec.org/bookchap/nbrnberbk/univ62-1.htm; FRITZ
MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM (1958), https://perma.cc/8RKEWCGM.
87
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II. HOW PATENT LAW NOW USES ANTITRUST LAW
The doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter is capable of reducing
decision cost because various aspects of the doctrine overlap in significant
ways with other criteria for patentability.91 Those other criteria are costly to
apply whereas subject-matter eligibility (in its current form) is less costly to
apply. It must ultimately be determined whether this reduction in decision
cost comes at the expense of unduly increasing the risk of error—simply put,
whether the decision cost savings are worth it—but the decision cost savings
are certainly present in most cases. The other criteria with which subjectmatter eligibility overlaps may be grouped into two sets of requirements:
those that promote innovation and those that promote disclosure.
A. Patentability’s Subject Matter Threshold
1. Policing Innovation
The innovation-related requirements of patentability include novelty,
nonobviousness, and utility. To be novel, an invention in all its particulars
must not be patented, disclosed, or otherwise available to the public.92 To
be nonobvious, an invention must be more than a trivial advance—not only
over individual prior inventions and products, but also over combinations of
prior inventions and products.93 Finally, to be useful, an invention must

91

For a comprehensive analytical treatment of doctrinal redundancy in patent law, see
John M. Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 673–99 (2016).
More specifically, the relationship between subject-matter eligibility and other doctrinal
requirements for patentability—especially nonobviousness—has been the subject of much
debate. In an important article following the Bilski decision, for example, Professor Josh
Sarnoff argued “that both patent eligibility under section 101 and patentability under section
103 require inventive creativity, and that even newly discovered science, nature, and ideas
must be treated as prior art.” Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski:
History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 101–02 (2011). From this, Sarnoff concludes that
“any claim to categorically excluded subject matter or any claim that lacks invention in
applying such subject matter should also necessarily be obvious, that is, so long as the
categorically excluded subject matter is treated as prior art for both eligibility and
patentability.” Id. at 102. Sarnoff’s argument, however, depends on two further premises.
One is that any inventiveness for eligibility purposes must not require claim construction, i.e.,
must be apparent on the face of the patent. With this he agrees, though he casts the issue as
one of satisfying the written description requirement. See id. at 111. The other premise,
however, is absent from his argument—that the court must also determine the relevant field
of the invention (not merely the person having ordinary skill in that field). Sarnoff’s overall
argument is certainly sound in that the desirability of a shortcut varies with the difficulty of
the task for which the shortcut is used; for example, resource-intensive tasks such as
construing claims should not be elided. Nevertheless, the very issue at stake in this Article is
how resource-intensive certain adjudicatory task should be in order to yield an outcome that
is both adequately correct and adequately affordable.
92
35 U.S.C. § 102.
93
35 U.S.C. § 103.
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fulfill a specific and substantial purpose,94 and although that purpose must
do more than merely avoid active harm to society,95 a detailed evaluation of
whether that purpose is economically, morally, or otherwise worth fulfilling
is largely left to the marketplace.96
The subject-matter eligibility doctrine reflects each of the innovationrelated requirements in some way. As an initial matter, processes, machines,
manufactures, and composition of matters, as well as improvements on these,
are eligible for patent protection.97 To this broad grant of eligibility, case
law has added important exceptions. Patents must not issue on laws (or
products) of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas,98 and the various
analyses by which courts have previously drawn analogies or distinctions
between the inventions before them and these categories of patent-ineligible
subject matter variously implicate novelty, nonobviousness, and utility.
The product-of-nature exception implicates all three. At times, courts
have invoked the exception to invalidate patents on inventions that were
merely found in nature or were only trivially different from a natural form.
For example, in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc., the Supreme Court held that medically valuable genomic DNA
sequences claimed by Myriad’s patent were products of nature and were
therefore ineligible for patent protection.99 Although the DNA sequences
were isolated and purified from their natural state, the Court emphasized that
the “location and order of the nucleotides [that make up the DNA sequence]
existed in nature before Myriad found them.”100 The Court’s concern was
that the invention, in some important sense, lacked newness.
Conversely, an invention may escape the product-of-nature exception
if it does exhibit such newness. For example, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
the Supreme Court held that a genetically engineered bacterium capable of
breaking down crude oil was not a product of nature and was therefore
eligible for patent protection.101 Although the underlying bacterium existed
naturally in the genus Pseudomonas, the Court emphasized that it had been
modified with inserted genes that conferred the ability to degrade
components of crude oil.102 The result was “a new bacterium with markedly

94

In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966).
96
Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817).
97
35 U.S.C. § 101.
98
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014); Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013).
99
Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2111.
100
Id. at 2116 (emphasis added).
101
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
102
Id. at 305.
95
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different characteristics from any found in nature.”103 The Court was
satisfied that the invention, in the same important sense, had newness.
At other times, courts have invoked the product-of-nature exception on
the basis of whether the claimed invention derived its utility from nature’s
handiwork or from human ingenuity. For example, in American Fruit
Growers v. Brogdex Co., the Supreme Court held that fresh citrus fruit with
rind or skin that had been treated with borax and which was therefore
resistant to blue mold decay was a product of nature and therefore ineligible
for patent protection.104 The Court emphasized that although the boraxtreated fruit was not found in nature as such, it underwent “no change in the
name, appearance, or general character” and remained “fit only for the same
beneficial uses as theretofore.”105 The Court’s concern was that the
invention’s utility arose primarily from natural causes rather than from
human intervention.
Conversely, an invention may escape the product-of-nature exception
if its utility does arise from human intervention. For example, in ParkeDavis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., Judge Learned Hand held that adrenalin
extracted from animal gland tissue and purified was not a product of nature
and was therefore patent-eligible.106 Although Judge Hand acknowledged
the chemical occurred in nature, he emphasized that the very act of extracting
and purifying it, as the inventor had done, rendered it “for every practical
purpose a new thing commercially and therapeutically.”107 Similarly, in
Chakrabarty, the Court noted that the engineered bacterium by virtue of its
marked difference also had “the potential for significant utility.”108 In each
case, the respective court was satisfied that the invention’s utility arose
primarily from human intervention.
Beyond products of nature, the law-of-nature and abstract-idea
exceptions also implicate the patent system’s concern with innovation,
particularly whether the relevant aspect of an invention is truly inventive—
i.e., nonobvious. For example, in Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., the Supreme Court held that a method for
calibrating drug dosage based on how much the drug’s byproducts remained
in the bloodstream was patent-ineligible because it did no more than apply
“well-understood, routine, conventional activity” to the laws of nature that

103

Id. at 310 (emphasis added).
Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931).
105
Id. at 11–12.
106
Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co, 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom. Parke-Davis & Co v. H K Mulford & Co, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
107
Id. at 103.
108
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310 (emphasis added).
104
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govern how drugs break down in the bloodstream.109 Similarly, in Alice
Corporation Pty. v. CLS Bank International, the Court extended its
reasoning in Mayo regarding laws of nature to abstract ideas as well.110 In
Alice, the Court held that a system for mitigating settlement risk in financial
transactions did no more than add “‘well-understood, routine, conventional
activit[ies]’ previously known to the industry” to what the Court believed
amounted to no more than the abstract idea of electronic recordkeeping and
was therefore patent-ineligible.111 In both Mayo and Alice, the Court’s
concern was that, beyond the law of nature or abstract idea on which the
invention relied, it lacked any truly inventive concept.
In fact, the degree to which the Court’s concern about the inventive
concept implicates patent law’s innovation function was quite explicit in the
Court’s previous approach for evaluating claims related to abstract ideas
such as mathematic formulas and algorithms—the so-called point of novelty
test. Under this approach, the underlying idea, formula, or algorithm was
treated “as though it were a familiar part of the prior art,” and the invention
was then scrutinized to find “some other inventive concept” in order to be
considered patent-eligible.112 This fiction—of assuming the underlying
ineligible natural law or idea into the body of prior knowledge—reveals that
protecting innovation-related values was a key problem that the Court tried
to solve through patent eligibility.
The upshot of these innovation-based views of the product-of-nature,
law-of-nature, and abstract-idea exceptions is that the doctrine of patenteligible subject matter was doing analytical work, and addressing policy
concerns about the proper scope of the patent system, that the narrower
doctrines of novelty, nonobviousness, or utility could have done.
2. Policing Disclosure
The disclosure-related requirements for patentability include
enablement and written description. To be adequately enabled, a patent must
disclose the invention that it claims with enough operational detail that a
person having ordinary skill in the relevant technology could practice the
invention without an undue amount of experimentation.113 To be welldescribed, a patent disclosure must convey what invention the inventor
actually considered herself to possess and supply adequate structural detail
109

Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79 (2012).
Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
111
Id. at 2359 (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 73 (2012)).
112
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 204 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591–95
(1978).
113
35 U.S.C. § 112(a); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
110
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for patent claims that define the invention in terms of the functions that the
invention performs.114 The subject-matter eligibility doctrine reflects both
of these patentability requirements as well.
As requirements that promote the disclosure of useful technical detail,
enablement and written description both guard against the same problem:
patent overbreadth. There is nothing inherently problematic about broad
patents or inherently desirable about narrow patents. The Patent Office may
properly issue broad or narrow patents just as inventors may generate
pioneering or incremental inventions to deserve such patents.115 What is
important to the innovation aims of the patent system is commensurability:
the breadth of a patent’s claims must not exceed the magnitude of the social
contribution that the invention represents.116
Multiple exceptions to patent-eligibility implicate the concern with
commensurability and the disclosure function of patents. With respect to
abstract ideas, for example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly invalidated
patents that it has found overbroad. For instance, in O’Reilly v. Morse, the
Court rejected Samuel Morse’s claim to all uses of electromagnetism for
printing characters at a distance, emphasizing that Morse had invented only
the particular form of telegraphy that his patent disclosed and that any future
applications were beyond what his patent described.117
Similarly, in Gottschalk v. Benson, the Court rejected a bare method for
converting binary-coded-decimal numbers into pure binary, emphasizing
that the method claimed was so “sweeping as to cover both known and
unknown uses” of the algorithm.118 In both cases, decided more than a
century apart, the Court’s concern was that the patents in dispute were
incommensurately broader than what they described and thus broader than
what the inventor demonstrably possessed as the invention.
This concern also animated the decision in Parker v. Flook, where the
Court rejected a method for updating limits on temperature, pressure, and
other operating conditions that an industrial process should not exceed.119
The Court held that the patent would “wholly preempt the mathematical
formula” that was used for calculating the limits from being available in

114
35 U.S.C. § 112(a); Ariad Pharm. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (en banc).
115
For a thorough theoretical account of why pioneering inventions ought to receive
broad patent rights, see Duffy, supra note 22.
116
See supra note 88 and accompanying text. See also Jason Rantanen, Patent Law’s
Disclosure Requirement, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369 (2013); Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling
After-Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 1083 (2009).
117
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1853).
118
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
119
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
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other inventive contexts.120 As before, the concern was that the reach of the
patent would exceed its inventive contribution.
Meanwhile, in Diamond v. Diehr, the Court expressed the same
concern but was satisfied that the mathematical equation that the inventors
implemented in a rubber curing process did not “preempt the use of that
equation” and held the invention patent-eligible.121
The law-of-nature exception implicates disclosure-related concerns as
well, in much the same way as the abstract-idea exception does. In Mayo,
for example, the Court’s innovation-related concerns about a missing
“inventive concept” over and above the natural law that governed how a drug
broke down in the bloodstream were closely aligned with the Court’s further
concern that upholding the patent would “too broadly preempt the use of
[that] natural law.”122 The patent in dispute addressed only a specific use of
the natural correlation between appropriate dosage and the level of drug
byproducts in the blood, and the Court’s reasoning reflects a concern that
upholding the patent would foreclose all uses of that natural correlation and
consequently frustrate commensurability in patent scope.
As was the case with the innovation-related requirements, the upshot of
these disclosure-related views of the abstract-idea and law-of-nature
exceptions is that the doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter ultimately
performed analytical work that the narrower disclosure-related doctrines of
enablement and written description could have done.
B. Subject-Matter Eligibility As a Shortcut
On first impression, it would seem to be a benefit that the doctrine of
subject-matter eligibility can stand in for the more decision cost-intensive
patentability requirements of novelty, nonobviousness, utility, enablement,
and written description. Indeed, litigation data regarding motion practice in
patent cases indicates that challenges based on subject-matter eligibility do
stand in for challenges based on these other requirements early in litigation,
when significant decision costs have not yet accrued.123
Among motions to dismiss, 83% of challenges to patent validity are
based on subject-matter ineligibility; among motions for judgment on the
pleadings, 93% of challenges. It is only after discovery, among motions for
summary judgment, that subject-matter ineligibility supports only 7% of
120

Id. at 589–90.
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (explaining that the patentee was
instead, permissibly, seeking “only to foreclose from others the use of that equation in
conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process”).
122
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012).
123
Litigation data is from the Docket Navigator service, which can be accessed at
http://www.docketnavigator.com.
121
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validity challenges while the other, more fact-intensive requirements begin
to play a more substantial role. Figures 1-3 illustrate this trend. Meanwhile,
it is almost entirely at summary judgment that any grounds other than
subject-matter ineligibility are raised. Figures 4-9 illustrate this trend. In
other words, the relationship in litigation between challenges based on
subject-matter eligibility and argumentation in early-stage, low-decision cost
procedural milestones is highly correlated in both directions.
Data from ex ante examination in the Patent Office further confirms the
ability of the subject-matter ineligibility doctrine to stand in for the other,
more decision cost-intensive patentability requirements.124 A novel dataset
of the prosecution records for 800 randomly selected patents reveals that,
where the examiner rejected the claimed invention as patent-ineligible
subject matter, the examiner in 86.6% of cases also rejected the invention for
failing to satisfy one of the following requirements: utility, novelty,
nonobviousness, enablement, written description, and definiteness.125 That
is to say, nearly seven out of every eight inventions that were challenged on
subject-matter ineligibility grounds were also challenged on at least one
other ground.126 Because failing to satisfy even a single requirement is
enough to defeat patentability,127 litigation data as well as examination data
suggest that most patentability disputes that are capable of being resolved on
the doctrine of subject-matter eligibility are also capable of being resolved
instead on a different ground.
These empirical findings indicate that litigated patents whose validity
is challenged are subjected to subject-matter eligibility attacks as a lowdecision-cost alternative to other grounds. The empirical findings also
suggest that issued patents in general that overcome subject-matter eligibility
rejections usually also overcome rejections on other grounds. Both ex ante
and ex post, therefore, the subject-matter eligibility requirement in patent law
is a significant doctrinal shortcut to the other requirements for
patentability—and an apparently inexpensive shortcut, at least in terms of
decision costs. There are significant problems, however, with this seeming
124
This empirical approach of comparing and correlating grounds for rejection is similar
that adopted in an earlier study of administrative appeals of examiner rejections, focusing
specifically on the correlation between rejections under the enablement requirement and
rejections under the written description requirement. Dennis Crouch, An Empirical Study of
the Role of the Written Description Requirement in Patent Prosecution, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
1665 (2010).
125
Prosecution records are publicly available data obtained from the Patent Office
website. The random sample consisted of 800 patents issued during the 10-year period of
2004 to 2013, inclusive. The prosecution records of these 800 patents contained 1,771 nonfinal and final rejections issued by examiners. These examiner rejections were reviewed by
hand and coded as to the grounds for rejection contained within them.
126
The specific findings underlying this conclusion are summarized in Table 1.
127
35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) (2012).
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benefit.
C. Problems with the Shortcut
Using the doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter as a sort of cheap
per se rule of unpatentability is problematic because of how its decision cost
savings arise. All of the more fact-intensive requirements for patentability
can properly be adjudicated only after two interrelated tasks have been
completed. One task is to specify the person having ordinary skill in the art
to which the invention pertains. Like the reasonably prudent person in tort
law, the person having ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical perspective
from which novelty, nonobviousness, utility, enablement, and written
description are explicitly or implicitly evaluated.128 In turn, properly
specifying the person of ordinary skill requires identifying the art itself, the
technological field in which the invention is situated.129 The other necessary
task is to construe the itemized claims of the patent in order to characterize
precisely what invention is patented.130 The need for resolving these issues
before adjudicating the novelty, nonobviousness, utility, enablement, and
written description requirements is the very thing that makes each of these
inquiries so fact-intensive.131
The Patent Office, for its part, determines the field of invention right
from the start132 and assigns the patent application to an appropriately trained
patent examiner,133 who is the agency’s stand-in for the person having
ordinary skill in the relevant art.134 The patent examiner, meanwhile,
evaluates the patent application only after construing the applicant’s claims,
giving the claims their “broadest reasonable construction.”135 Courts,
however, have generally applied the subject-matter eligibility doctrine
without regard to the person having ordinary skill in the art to which the
128
For discussion of how pervasively the person having ordinary skill in the art informs
patentability requirements, see Brenda M. Simon, The Implications of Technological
Advancement for Obviousness, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 331 (2013); Jonathan
J. Darrow, The Neglected Dimension of Patent Law’s PHOSITA Standard, 23 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 227 (2009); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the
Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885 (2004).
129
Vishnubhakat, The Field of Invention, supra note 40, at 929–31 (discussing the
overlooked but normatively desirable practice of specifying the field of invention prior to a
PHOSITA analysis).
130
Id. at 925–34 (tracing the doctrinal need for claim construction prior to each of the
innovation-related and disclosure-related requirements for patentability).
131
See supra, note 74 and accompanying text.
132
Vishnubhakat, The Field of Invention, supra note 40, at 903–04.
133
Id. at 906–07.
134
Id. at 906. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 128, at 888 (arguing that examiners skill “may
provide a proxy for the tacit knowledge of PHOSITA, but examiners are at best former
practitioners whose practical technological skills inevitably decline with time”).
135
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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patented invention pertains—indeed, without specifying the art at all—and
without construing the claims of the patent.136
These lapses in the judicial use of subject-matter eligibility as a per se
shortcut is problematic for two reasons. First, in antitrust law, the content of
the per se rule is to be determined and applied only sparingly: such caution
is recognized by the literature137 and by the courts.138 The specific types of
conduct that should be considered so clearly and consistently anticompetitive
as to be conclusively presumed unreasonable are the result of long
experience with anticompetitive practices.139 By contrast, the doctrine of
patent-eligible subject matter has been applied unevenly throughout its
history, with little empirical basis for presuming that certain requirements
for patentability in certain contexts will produce results that are so consistent
that a more fact-intensive inquiry such as novelty, nonobviousness,
enablement, etc. would be superfluous.140
Second, and perhaps more importantly, even the per se rule requires an
initial characterization of the relevant market and of the allegedly
anticompetitive conduct. For example, fixing prices may conclusively be
presumed illegal,141 but one must still establish the market in which price
fixing is said to occur.142 Self-evidently, one must also demonstrate that
what the accused party did was, in fact, tantamount to price-fixing. By
contrast, the inquiry into subject-matter eligibility proceeds without
identifying the field of the invention,143 and frequently without
characterizing through claim construction what the patent actually claims.144
136
See Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Patent-Eligible Processes: An Audience
Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 349, 363–76 (2015).
137
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Sharp Dealing: The Horizontal/Vertical Dichotomy in
Distributor Termination Cases, 38 EMORY L.J. 311, 364 (1989); Scott G. Crowley, Note,
Antitrust: Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.—A Better Rule For Vertical
Restraints, But Is It Legal?, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1035, 1035 n.2 (1987); William J. Sims,
Note, NCAA v. Board of Regents and a Truncated Rule of Reason: Retaining Flexibility
Without Sacrificing Efficiency, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 193, 198 (1985).
138
Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49–51 (1977).
139
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). But see Arizona v. Maricopa
Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 349 (1982) (distinguishing between the creation of new per
se prohibitions and the application of existing ones).
140
Duffy, supra note 7, at 623–38 (discussing the historical record of judicial failures in
crafting stable, durable rules of patentability).
141
Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344–45 (1982); Standard Oil Co.
of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911).
142
See Bogan v. Hodgkins, 166 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that “it is an
element of a per se case to describe the relevant market in which we may presume the
anticompetitive effect would occur”).
143
Vishnubhakat, The Field of Invention, supra note 40, at 906–08 (discussing the rarity
with which courts make any initial taxonomic determinations at all on their way to more
substantive conclusions about patent validity).
144
Holbrook & Janis, supra note 136, at 363–64.
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Thus, the supposed judicial efficiency of evaluating patent validity on
the basis of subject-matter ineligibility comes at the risk of making an
incorrect evaluation. Decision costs may be lower, but error costs are likely
higher. For this reason, the way in which courts currently use the doctrine
of subject-matter ineligibility as an inexpensive shortcut for other, more
precise doctrinal patentability requirements is unsound.
IV. BORROWING MORE RESPONSIBLY FROM ANTITRUST
The inappropriateness of the current practice, however, is not to say
that subject-matter eligibility may never be used to avoid more judicially
costly doctrinal inquiries. The example of antitrust is itself a lesson that
approaches for lowering decision cost are not to be disregarded lightly—so
long as they are not employed lightly, either. Just as the rule of reason can
give way to per se simplifications, costlier patentability doctrines can also
give way to a simpler subject-matter eligibility analysis, where certain
antecedent requirements have been satisfied in order to minimize error and
where the resulting subject-matter eligibility analysis still presents a lower
decision cost.
A. Defining the Market: The Field of Invention
One antecedent requirement before evaluating whether an invention
constitutes patent-eligible subject matter is defining the field of the
invention. The field of invention is a long-overlooked inquiry in how the
courts assess patentability, and not only in subject-matter eligibility issues.
Every major requirement for patentability implicates an underlying
taxonomic choice about how to define the field of a given invention.145 The
Patent Office makes these taxonomic choices regularly, informedly, and
systematically in accordance with express statutory authority,146 but courts
ignore, assume, or improvise this important inquiry.147
What courts do instead, at least implicitly, is adjudicate patentability
questions such as novelty, nonobviousness, enablement, etc., from the
perspective of the person having ordinary skill in the art.148 This is a step
toward resolving a given patentability issue more accurately by defining the
scope of the inquiry more precisely—just as defining the relevant market in
antitrust does. Identifying only the person having ordinary skill in the art,
however, is insufficient for this purpose in two ways. One is that the inquiry
is litigated between adversarial parties who have a direct and partisan interest

145
146
147
148

See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 129–32 and accompanying text.
See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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in the substantive effects of how to define the person of ordinary skill in the
art. As a result, the evidence that parties present to courts and the
conclusions that courts ultimately reach may bear little relation to the actual
field of a given invention.149
Another reason is that resolving this question in the courts at all
presents a significant structural bias based on hindsight, even apart from the
private biases of the litigants.150 When the Patent Office classifies an
invention according to its technological taxonomy and assigns the invention
to a patent examiner trained in that field as a stand-in for the person having
ordinary skill in the relevant art, the determinations of the agency are much
closer in time to the actual state of science and technology within which the
invention was developed.151 By the time patents have been issued, have been
asserted, and are being litigated in court years later, the state of technology
will have changed, sometimes dramatically.152 The result is that even courts
that are willing and able to look beyond the self-interested arguments of
litigants confront significant difficulties in accurately recapturing a past state
of affairs from scratch.
For these reasons, courts evaluating whether a given patentability
requirement, such as nonobviousness or enablement, has been satisfied
should defer to the taxonomic classifications made by the Patent Office
during examination.153 Under ordinary principles of administrative law,
these agency classifications are informal adjudications of fact that should
survive except where courts find them arbitrary and capricious.154 Disputes
in litigation over Patent Office classifications may, indeed, increase in the
short run as courts begin to give this appropriate deference. However, the
149
This criticism has much in common (though is not congruent) with broader criticisms
of the “adversarial legalism” in American civil litigation. The adversarial legalism critique,
too, emphasizes the cost and uncertainty generated by relying on individual partisan lawsuits
as a mode of social governance. E.g., ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE
AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2003).
150
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1523–27 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive
Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 613–14 (1998).
Hindsight bias in patent law is most commonly discussed in the context of the nonobviousness
requirement. E.g., Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration
That the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006).
As the broader discussion by Professors Jolls, et al., and Rachlinski show, however, there is
no reason to expect that hindsight bias is not a risk in any number of patentability-related
inquiries, both legal and factual.
151
Vishnubhakat, The Field of Invention, supra note 41, at 939–40.
152
Id. at 45.
153
Id. at 43–50 (discussing the general case for judicial deference, articulating the legal
standard by which judges ought to practice deference, and the operational form that deference
should take where technological taxonomy is concerned).
154
Id. at 46.
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early resolution of the field of the invention will also offer greater up-front
clarity about downstream issues, such as who the person having ordinary
skill in that field might be and what scope the patent should be interpreted as
having.
The same logic and the same benefits apply to the subject-matter
eligibility doctrine as well. The policies that have animated judicial
development of what ought to be patent-eligible are broadly concerned with
innovation and disclosure.155 Thus, inventions must be truly innovative in
the sense of having sufficient human intervention to differentiate them and
render them more useful as compared to what nature already provides.156
They must also be sufficiently well disclosed in the sense that patents must
teach everything that they claim and describe everything that they exclude.157
In short, patents must not preempt products of nature or principles of nature,
nor the knowledge that these represent, for the use and application of these
natural products and principles should remain available for others to build
and innovate upon. This anxiety over preemption, and the Court’s use of the
subject-matter eligibility doctrine to address it, is reflected in cases as old as
Morse158 and as recent as Mayo.159
What such judicial uses of the eligibility doctrine have lacked thus far,
however, is a rule of decision for defining the technological domain within
which a patent can be evaluated as overbroad and therefore preemptive—or
else not overbroad and therefore eligible. That is to say, before a court can
determine that a patent preempts an entire field, the court must know what
the relevant field is. This is precisely the taxonomic exercise that the Patent
Office conducts at the outset of every patent examination in accordance with
its statutory authority and agency expertise.160 Thus, a court that sets out to
define the relevant technology within which to scrutinize the preemptive
breadth of a patent need only defer to the Patent Office classification of the
field of invention under ordinary principles of administrative law, adding
little decision cost but considerably reducing potential error cost.
B. Defining the Conduct: Claim Construction
The other antecedent requirement before evaluating whether an
invention constitutes patent-eligible subject matter is construing the patent
claims to determine what they actually encompass. Claim construction is a

155
156
157
158
159
160

See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.A.1.
See supra Part III.A.2.
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
Vishnubhakat, The Field of Invention, supra note 41, at 903–04.
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key inquiry both in patent examination161 and patent litigation,162 such that
judges who handle even a modest caseload of patent disputes quickly
become familiar with it.163 Nevertheless, this familiarity is rarely
synonymous with expertise, sometimes even for judges who see large
numbers of patent cases.164 Claim constructions by trial courts are reversed
on appeal at notoriously high rates in the Federal Circuit.165
As a result, claim constructions in district courts pose particularly acute
problems of uncertainty in the contours of patent rights. At one side is
vertical certainty, the assurance that a patent that is construed one way in the
district court will likely be construed the same way on appeal, reducing the
need for protracted and expensive litigation.166 The Federal Circuit can offer
this assurance by evaluating lower-court claim constructions under a
deferential standard of appellate review.167 The cost of this deferential
review, however, is less horizontal certainty, the assurance that a patent that
is construed one way in a given litigation will be construed the same way in
other litigations.168 To defer to lower courts, after all, is to allow inconsistent
outcomes to coexist unless they are so indefensible that they must be
overturned.169 The Federal Circuit can ensure horizontal certainty only by
reviewing patent claim constructions de novo, and in that framework, the
161

Joel Miller, Claim Construction at the PTO—The “Broadest Reasonable
Interpretation. . .”, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 279 (2006).
162
Peter S. Menell, Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, Patent Claim Construction:
A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 714–15 (2010).
163
Andrew T. Zidel, Comment, Patent Claim Construction in the Trial Courts: A Study
Showing the Need for Clear Guidance From the Federal Circuit, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 711,
746 n.283 (2003) (citation omitted) (indicating that federal trial court judges are “quite
familiar with the analytical rules of claim construction”).
164
See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 223 (2008) (finding
that there is no significant relationship between judges’ cumulative experience with claim
construction and the likelihood of having their claim construction rulings reversed on appeal
in the Federal Circuit).
165
See, e.g., id.; J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical,
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1
(2013); Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075 (2001); W. Michael Schuster, Claim Construction and
Technical Training: An Empirical Study of the Reversal Rates of Technically Trained Judges
in Patent Claim Construction Cases, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 887 (2011); David L. Schwartz,
Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Comparing Patent
Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade Commission, 50 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1699 (2009).
166
See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, An Intentional Tort Theory of Patents, 68 FLA. L. REV.
571, 595 (2016) (discussing the trade-off between the costs of decision and error in a given
lawsuit versus the costs of decision and error as to the same patent across many lawsuits).
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
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result is necessarily that district courts’ claim constructions in a given case
will receive less appellate deference and so will be reversed more often,
producing high vertical uncertainty.170 Indeed, this is precisely the choice
with which the Supreme Court was recently confronted.
The Supreme Court held over twenty years ago that the enterprise of
claim construction is not wholly a question of law, nor of fact, but instead is
a “mongrel practice.”171 Only recently, in 2015, did the Supreme Court
further clarify that the subsidiary factual findings that a court makes in the
course of construing patent claims are not to be reviewed de novo, but under
a “clear error” standard.172 In other words, the Court favored vertical
certainty in a nod toward the decision costs that district courts invest into
construing claims. However, these claim construction investments are not a
systematic part of determining whether a patent is directed to eligible subject
matter. Instead, courts have mixed local practices regarding whether
motions to dismiss—which overwhelmingly rely on subject-matter
eligibility challenges173—are indeed permitted to make a subject matterbased challenge prior to claim construction.174
Although these local practices differ based on the varying weight that
judges give to efficiency considerations—i.e., to their decision costs as
individual courts—the availability of subject-matter eligibility challenges
without claim construction ignores the considerable potential for error in
making broad generalizations about the boundaries of the patent system itself
without any precise understanding of the individual patents whose claimed
subject matter is deemed eligible or not. Just as per se analysis in antitrust,
for all its categorical severity, still requires characterizing the allegedly
unlawful economic conduct, so also should per se-style analysis of
patentability require characterizing the allegedly patent-ineligible subject
matter.
There are at least two ways in which to structure this inquiry without
incurring the fact-discovery costs of a full-blown claim construction. One is
to require a proposed claim construction by the patent owner itself and to
take that construction as true for purposes of the subject-matter eligibility
evaluation. This method is well in line with the general pleading-stage rule
that, for motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, courts must accept factual matters as true and draw all reasonable
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Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman II), 517 U.S. 370, 372, 378 (1996).
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Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015).
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See infra Figure 1.
174
Divergent local practices as to Alice motions in the pleading stage are also the subject
of a work in progress by Professor Paul Gugliuzza.
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inferences in favor of the nonmoving party—here, the patent owner.175
The second method is to allow limited discovery of only those fact
questions that bear on subject-matter eligibility, especially defining the field
of invention and the person of ordinary skill in that art. This, too, would be
in line with the common pleading-stage practice of allowing matters outside
the pleadings, thereby converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment.176
Under both approaches, the additional decision costs can be limited so
that the gains of quickly adjudicating patents that clearly constitute patentineligible subject matter are not dissipated. A patent that fails even under
these generous circumstances may reliably be invalidated without a high risk
of error. A patent that survives a subject-matter eligibility challenge,
meanwhile, may still face more detailed scrutiny about patentability. This
outcome, too, has a clear analog in the antitrust approach to decision costs
and error costs. Accused antitrust violators can avoid per se condemnation
if they survive so-called quick look review, a tentative evaluation of facts
that tend to show procompetitive effects from the accused conduct.177
Surviving quick-look review does not establish per se legality, but merely
escapes per se illegality and invites a more detailed analysis under the rule
of reason.178 Similarly, patents that survive a subject-matter eligibility
challenge on the pleadings or after limited fact discovery would not be held
per se valid, but would merely escape per se invalidation and proceed to a
more detailed review under narrower, more specific patentability doctrines
such as novelty, nonobviousness, utility, and so on.
C. Avoiding the Question: The Crouch-Merges Canon
The preceding discussion of antecedent requirements for a proper
subject-matter eligibility inquiry argues for a robust rethinking of current
patent practice, but these proposed reforms are not unbounded. Satisfying
these requirements merely takes proper account of error costs, and the
resulting subject-matter eligibility analysis may sometimes still present a
decision cost that is low enough to warrant per se or quick look-style
adjudication. At other times, however, the resulting analysis may prove to
be no cheaper than a narrower patentability analysis such as novelty or
nonobviousness would have been. In these cases, there is good reason to
175

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); 5B CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357 (3d ed. 2015).
176
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
177
Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769–71 (1999).
178
United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 677–78 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding from a quick
look that a full inquiry under the rule of reason was necessary because the university financial
aid agreements in question had sufficiently procompetitive potential).
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avoid the subject-matter eligibility doctrine and instead to decide the
question on narrower grounds for patentability.
This avoidance doctrine has been advanced by Professors Crouch and
Merges based on pragmatic policy concerns and on empirical findings that
avoidance would be meaningfully available.179 Specifically, they find that
“a substantial number of patent claims lacking subject matter eligibility
under of [sic] § 101 also fail to satisfy at least one other validity test.”180 By
one estimate, some 84% of patent applications that are rejected for subjectmatter ineligibility are also rejected for failing either novelty or
nonobviousness.181 By another estimate, conducted by Crouch and Merges,
in 94% of administrative appeals from examiner rejections, claims that
examiners reject on subject-matter eligibility grounds are also rejected on at
least one other ground.182 The novel dataset and study presented above on
grounds for rejection found in the prosecution records of 800 randomly
selected patents, similarly finds that about 87% of patent applications that
are rejected for subject-matter eligibility are also rejected as lacking either
utility, novelty, nonobviousness, enablement, written description, or
definiteness.183
However, an empirical view of patent-eligible subject matter as a
meaningful per se shortcut to other validity criteria additionally raises the
reverse question: how frequently do patent claims that raise validity concerns
under one of the narrower patentability requirements (of utility, novelty,
nonobviousness, enablement, written description, or definiteness) also
implicate the broader issue of subject-matter eligibility? Analysis of the
same novel dataset reveals that this occurs in only 9.4% of patents.
Moreover, only in 1.5% of patents is subject-matter eligibility observed as a
validity concern without any of the other identified requirements.
Thus, avoiding subject-matter eligibility by relying on a narrower
ground is feasible for a large majority of patents (estimated by various
measures as 84%, 87%, or 94%). Avoiding subject-matter eligibility is
unlikely to leave otherwise invalid patents in force, for only in relatively few
patents (9.4%) does a narrow validity concern also implicate the broad
problems of subject-matter eligibility. And for only a very small subset of
patents (1.5%) does the subject-matter eligibility doctrine do validitydeterminative work that no other doctrine does. This data independently
179
Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering
Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673 (2010).
180
Id. at 1686.
181
Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Do Applicant Patent
Citations Matter?, 42 RES. POL’Y 844 (2013).
182
Crouch & Merges, supra note 179, at 1686.
183
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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corroborates, therefore, that the Crouch-Merges proposal would be an apt
avoidance canon by filtering most cases with little risk of error and leaving
relatively few difficult cases in which the avoided doctrine plays a truly
useful, outcome-determinative role.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article argues to re-conceptualize the relationship between patent
law’s subject-matter eligibility requirement and the other major
requirements for patentability as akin to the relationship in antitrust law
between the per se rule and the rule of reason in evaluating restraints of trade.
Courts’ use of subject-matter eligibility as a shortcut to other patentability
requirements appears to offer significant savings in decision cost, but these
savings likely come at the expense of higher error costs because courts
currently fail to answer necessary underlying questions about the nature of
the invention and the technological field in which the invention is situated.
Engaging in a subject-matter eligibility analysis without answering these
questions is no more sensible than condemning an economic activity as per
se anticompetitive without defining the relevant market and characterizing
the economic activity in antitrust law.
The remedy for this ill-conceived reduction in decision cost while
ignoring error cost is threefold. First, courts should evaluate the subjectmatter eligibility of patented inventions only after specifying the
technological field of the patented invention and identifying the person of
ordinary skill in that relevant field, just as the Patent Office does. Second,
courts that purport to find patents invalid for claiming patent-ineligible
subject matter should do so only after construing what invention the patent
actually claims. Finally, courts should adopt a canon of avoiding questions
of patent eligibility altogether in favor of deciding patentability on narrower
statutory grounds whenever possible. These measures offer a more
jurisprudentially disciplined way for courts to balance their competing
obligations to resolve patent cases both efficiently and accurately.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1. The Use of Subject Matter Eligibility with Other Grounds for
Rejection in Patent Office Examination
Ground for Rejection
Made Together with
Subject-Matter Eligibility
Utility
Novelty
Non-obviousness
Enablement
Written Description
Definiteness
Cumulative share
(at least one of the above)

Share
0.00%
56.10%
68.29%
8.54%
8.54%
43.90%
86.59%

Each individual share is calculated by reference to the total number of
rejections on a given ground.
For example:
share for novelty =

# of examiner rejections that contained both a
novelty challenge and a subject matter eligibility
challenge
total # of examiner rejections that contained a
subject matter eligibility challenge

The cumulative share is calculated by combining the individual shares as
follows:

cumulative share =

# of examiner rejections that contained both a
novelty challenge and at least one of the above
grounds
total # of examiner rejections that contained a
subject matter eligibility challenge
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Figure 1. Patent Invalidity Grounds Asserted in Motions to Dismiss
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Figure 2. Patent Invalidity Grounds Asserted in Motions for Judgment
on the Pleadings
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Figure 3. Patent Invalidity Grounds Asserted in Motions for Summary
Judgment
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Figure 4. Stages of Litigation at Which Subject-Matter Ineligibility Is
Asserted
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Figure 5. Stages of Litigation at Which Lack of Utility Is Asserted
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Figure 6. Stages of Litigation at Which Anticipation Is Asserted
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Figure 7. Stages of Litigation at Which Lack of Obviousness Is
Asserted
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Figure 8. Stages of Litigation at Which Lack of Enablement Is
Asserted
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Figure 9. Stages of Litigation at Which Lack of Written Description
Is Asserted
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